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Abstract. In this paper we apply the complete analysis of a differentiable game (recently introduced by the author) to 
determine possible suitable behaviors (actions) of tourism firms during strategic interactions with other tourism firms, 
from both non-cooperative and cooperative point of view. To associate with a real strategic interaction among tourism 
firms a differentiable game any player’s strategy-set must, for instance, be a part of a topological vector space, closure 
of an open subset of the space. The most frequent case is that in which the strategy-sets are compact intervals of the real 
line. On the other hand, very often, the actions at disposal of a player can form a finite set, and in this case a natural 
manner to construct a game representing the economic situation is the von Neumann convexification (also known as 
canonical extension) that leads to a differentiable game with probabilistic scenarios, and thus even more suitable for the 
purpose of represent real interactions. For what concerns the complete analysis of a differentiable game, its first goal is 
the precise knowledge of the Pareto boundaries (maximal and minimal) of the payoff space, this knowledge will allow 
us to evaluate the quality of the different Nash equilibria (by the distances from the Nash equilibria themselves to 
Pareto  boundaries,  with  respect  to  appropriate  metrics),  in  order  to  determine  some  “focal”  equilibrium  points 
collectively more satisfactory than each other. Moreover, the complete knowledge of the payoff-space will allow to 
develop explicitly the cooperative phase of the game and the various bargaining problems rising from the strategic 
interaction of the tourist firms (Nash bargaining problem, Kalai-Smorodinski bargaining problem and so on). In the 
paper we shall deal with some practical study cases. 
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Game theory has proved a powerful tool to suggest the strategies that must be employed by rational tourism firms in 
competitive environments. Nevertheless, in the great part of current literature on the matter, the methodologies used are 
drawn only from the Finite Game Theory, and this precludes several more deep applications, studies and developments. 
In this paper, on the contrary, we concentrate our attention on infinite differentiable games, which are models more 
complex and can be greatly more adherent to the real economic situations. In order to illustrate an application of the 
complete study of an infinite differentiable game, introduced in [2] and [6] by the author, a case of pricing decisions and 
entry deterrence are considered, starting form a simple finite game (see, for similar finite games, [1]), we show how the 
complete study of its mixed extension gives many useful answers than the study of the finite one. 
 
1. The complete study of a game 
 
We recall that for the complete study of a game we shall follow the following points of investigation, we shall: 
 
0a) classify the game (linear, symmetric, invertible, symmetric in the strategies, ...); 
0b) find the critical zone of the game and its image by f; 
0c) determine the biloss space im(f); 
0d) determine inf and sup of the game and see if they are shadow optima; 
0e) determine the Pareto boundaries of the bistrategy space and their images by f; 
1a) specify the control of each player upon the boundaries; 
1b) specify the noncooperative reachability and controllability of the Pareto boundaries; 
1c) find the possible Pareto solutions and crosses; 
1d) find devotion correspondences and devotion equilibria; 
1e) specify the efficiency and noncooperative reachability of devotion equilibria; 
2a) find best reply correspondences and Nash equilibria; 
2b) study the existence of Nash equilibria (Brouwer and Kakutany); 
2c) evaluate Nash equilibria: noncooperative reachability, position with respect to and, efficiency, devotion; 
2d) find, if there are, dominant strategies; 2e) find strict and dominant equilibria, reduce the game by elimination of dominated strategies; 
3a) find conservative values and worst loss functions of the players; 
3b) find conservative strategies and crosses; 
3c) find all the conservative parts of the game (in the bistrategy and biloss spaces); 
3d) find core of the game and conservative knots; 
3e) evaluate Nash equilibria by the core and the conservative bivalue; 
4a) find the worst offensive correspondences and the offensive equilibria; 
4b) specify noncooperative reachability of the offensive equilibria and their efficiency; 
4c) find the worst offensive strategies of each player and the corresponding loss of the other; 
4d) find the possible dominant offensive strategies; 
4e) confront the possible non-cooperative solutions; 
5a) find the elementary best compromises (Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions) and corresponding biloss; 
5b) find the elementary core best compromise and corresponding biloss; 
5c) find the Nash bargaining solutions and corresponding bilosses; 
5d) find the solutions with closest bilosses to the shadow minimum; 
5e) find the maximum collective utility solutions; 
5f) confront the possible cooperative solutions. 
6f) study the transferable utility case. 
 
This kind of study has been proposed by D. Carfì in [2], and it springs from the bases given by J.P. Aubin in [3] and [4]. 
For a deep introduction to Pareto boundaries the reader can see [5]. 
 
2. The deterrence-pricing game 
 
The economic situation. We consider two tourism firms. The second one is already in the market the first one is not. 
The possible strategies of the first are Enter (in the market) and Not Enter (in market). The strategies of the second one 
are High prices and Low prices. The payoff (losses) of the two firms are represented in the following table: 
 
      High prices    Low prices 
  Enter    (-4,-2)      (0,-3) 
  Not enter  (0,-3)      (0,-4) 
 
The finite game associated with the economic situation. The above table defines a bimatrix M and, consequently, a 
finite loss game (M,<). It is evident that the pair of strategies (Enter, Low prices) is a dominant Nash equilibrium of the 
game, in other terms it’s a strict Nash equilibrium. This Nash equilibrium leads to the payoff (0,-3). 
 
Problems. We have to do some considerations: 
 
1)  the second player could gain much more if the first does not enter; 
2)  the market offers a potential total gain 6, in correspondence to the bistrategy (Enter, High prices). 
 
We have three questions: 
 
a)  is it possible for the second player to gain more than 3? 
b)  is it possible that the two firms collectively obtain the total amount offered by the market? 
c)  if the case (b) happens, what is a possible fair division of the total amount among the firms? 
 
We shall answer to these questions during our study. To do so, we consider the mixed extension of the game (M,<). 
 
3. The mixed extension  
 
Scope of the mixed extension. We shall examine the von Neumann extension of the finite game (M,<) to find other 
possible realistic and applicable economic behaviours and solutions. 
 
The Extension. We, firstly, have to imbed (canonically) the finite strategy spaces into the probabilistic canonical 1-
simplex of the plane (since there are two strategies per firm). The strategy Enter (and High prices) shall be transformed 
into the first canonical vector e1 of the plane and the strategy Non Enter (and Low prices) shall be transformed into the 
second canonical vector of the plane e2. So our new bistrategy space is the Cartesian square of the canonical 1-simplex 
of the plane (wich is the convex envelop of the canonical base e of the plane): conv(e)
2. It is a 2-dimension bistrategy 
space, since the canonical 1-simplex is 1-dimensional. So we can imbed the simplex in the real line R and the bistrategy 
space into the Euclidean plane R
2. To do this, roughly speaking, we consider the injection associating with the pure 
strategies Enter and High prices the probability 1 and to the pure strategies Not Enter and Low prices the probability 0. In other (rigorous) terms, we associate to the mixed strategy (x,1-x) the probability x of the interval [0,1] and to the 
mixed strategy (y,1-y) the probability y of the same interval. Moreover, the considered finite loss game (M,<) is the 
translation by the loss vector (0,-4) of the game (M’,<) represented in the following table: 
 
      High prices    Low prices 
  Enter    (-4,2)      (0,1) 
  Not enter  (0,1)      (0,0) 
 
The mixed extension of the game (M,<) is, thus, the translation, by the same vector, of the extension of the game 
(M’,<), so we can study this latter extension. 
 
4. The study of the mixed extension 
 
Formal  description  of  the  game  under  study.  The  mixed  extension  of  the  finite  game  (M’,<)  is  the  infinite 




  f(x,y) = (-4xy,x+y), 
 
for every bistrategy (x,y) of the game. We shall denote the bistrategy space by S. The bistrategy space is the Cartesian 
square [0,1]
2, and we shall denote by A, B, C and D its four vertices (0,0), (1,0), (1,1) and (0,1). 
 
Remark. The conservative bivalue of the finite bimatrix game M is the pair (0,1). 
 
Classification. The game is not linear, it is, utterly, bilinear. It is not symmetric with respect to the players, since the 
loss f1(x,y) is different from the loss f2(y,x), but it is symmetric with respect to the bistrategies, since fi(x,y) equals fi(y,x), 
for every player i. It is not invertible, since there are two different equivalent bistrategies, since the biloss f(1,0) equals 
the biloss f(0,1), which equals the biloss (0,1). 
 
5. The critical space of the mixed extension 
 
Jacobian matrix. The Jacobian matrix of the function f at a point (x,y) of the bystrategy space S - denoted by Jf(x,y) - is 
the matrix having as rows the gradients of the loss functions f1 and f2, respectively, that are grad f1(x,y) = (-4y,-4x) and 
grad f2(x,y) = (1,1), for every bistrategy (x,y). The Jacobian determinant, at the bistrategy (x,y), is det Jf(x,y) = -4y+4x, 
for every pair (x,y) in the bistrategy space S. 
 
Critical space. The critical zone is the subset of the bistrategy space S of those bistrategies (x,y) at which the jacobian 
matrix is not invertible, that is verifying the relation detJf (x,y) = 0, i.e., x = y. In symbols, the critical zone is the set 
 
  C(f) = {(x,y) in S : x = y} = [A,C]. 
 
Transformation of the critical space. We must determine the image f([A,C]). The segment [A,C] is the set of real pairs 
(x,y) such that x = y and y is in the interval [0,1]. The value of the biloss function on the generic point (y,y) of that 
segment is f(y,y) = (-4y
2,2y). Setting, for any y in [0,1], X = -4y
2 and Y = 2y, we have y = Y/2 and X = -Y
2, with Y in 
[0,2]. Thus, the image of the critical zone is the parabolic segment of equation X = -Y
2 with end points A’ = f(A) = (0,0) 
and C’ = f(C) = (-4,2). 
 
6. The biloss (disutility) space 
 
Transformation of the topological boundary of the bistrategy space. We start from the image f([A,B]). The segment 
[A,B] is the set of points (x,y) of the Euclidean plane such that the ordinate y equals 0 and the abscissa x lies in the 
interval [0,1]. The value of the biloss function upon the generic point (x,0) of this segment is the biloss f(x,0) = (0,x). 
Setting, for all x in E, X = 0 and Y = x, we have X = 0 and Y belonging to [0,1]. Thus the image of the segment [A,B] is 
the segment of end points A’ = (0,0) and B’ = f(B) = (0,1). Image of the segment [D,C]. The segment [D,C] is the set 
of points (x,y) such that y = 1 and x lies in [0,1]. The image of the generic point (x,1) of this segment is therefore the 
biloss f(x,1) = (-4x,x+1). Setting, for all x in E, X = -4x and Y = x+1, we have x = Y-1 and X = -4Y+4, with Y in [1,2]. 
Thus the image is the segment of end points D’ = f(D) = (0,1) and C’ = (-4,2). Transformation of the segment [C,B]. 
The segment [C,B] is the set of all points of the plane such that x = 1 and y is in [0,1]. The image of the generic 
bistrategy of this segment is the biloss f(1,y) = (-4y,1+y). Setting, for any Frances’ strategy y in F, X = -4y and Y = 1+y, 
we obtain y = Y-1 and X = -4Y+4. Then, the image is the set of bilosses (X,Y) such that X = 4-4Y, with Y is in the 
interval [-4,0]. So the image is the segment of end points C’ = (-4,2) and B’ = (0,1). Transformation of the segment 
[A,D]. The segment [A,D] is the set of bistrategies (x,y) such that x = 0 and y lies in the interval [0,1]. The image of the generic point of this segment is the biloss f(0,y) = (0,y). Setting, for all y in F, Y = y, we obtain X = 0 and Y belonging 
to [0,1]. So the image is the segment of end points A’ = (0,0) and D’ = (0,1). 
 
The biloss space. The biloss space f(S) is simply the bounded part of the plane having for topological boundary the 
union of the four above images with the image of the critical part of the game.  
 
Extrema of the game. The extrema of the game are the infimum infG = (-4,0) - not belonging to the biloss space f(S) of 
the game G – and the supremum supG = (0,2) – also in this case, not belonging to the biloss space f(S). They are, thus, 
two shadow extremes. 
 
0e) Pareto boundaries. The Pareto minimal and maximal boundaries of the biloss space are, respectively: the image of 
the critical zone of the game, that is the parabolic arc with end points A’ and C’ we already considered, and the segment 
[B’,C’]. The Pareto minimal and maximal boundaries of the bistrategy space are, respectively, the segment [A,C] and 




7. I phase: non-cooperative friendly phase 
 
1a) Pareto-controls. Both Emil and Frances do not control the Pareto minimal boundary. On the contrary, Emil controls 
part of the Pareto maximal boundary, precisely the segment [B,C] playing the control strategy 1. Frances controls part 
of the Pareto maximal boundary, precisely the segment [D,C] playing the control strategy 1. 
 
1b) Non-cooperative reachability of Pareto boundaries. Both players can reach non-cooperatively the Pareto maximal 
boundary playing the respective reaching-strategies 1 and 1, respectively. Neither Emil nor Frances can reach non-
cooperatively the Pareto minimal boundary (very regrettably). 
 
1c) Non-cooperative Pareto solutions. Do not exist non-cooperative minimal Pareto solutions. There is only a non-
cooperative maximal Pareto solution, the bistrategy C = (1,1), that is a control-cross. 
 
1d) Devotion correspondences. The partial derivative of the Emil’s loss function f with respect to the second argument 
is D2f1(x,y) = -4x, for every bistrategy (x,y) in the space S, then, concerning its sign, there are two cases: x = 0 and x >0. 
If x is zero, then the partial function f1(x,.) is constant and then all Frances’ strategies are devote to Emil’ strategy 0. If Emil’s strategy x is strictly positive, then the partial loss function f1(x,.) is strictly decreasing, and then his minimum 
value is reached at the point 1. Concluding, the Frances’ devotion correspondence is defined by L2(x) = F if x = 0 and 
L2(x) = 1 if x > 0, for each Emil’s strategy x in E. Concerning Emil's devotion, we have D1f2(x,y) = 1, so the Frances’ 
partial loss function f2(.,y) is strictly increasing, for every strategy y in F, and then it assumes its minimum at the 
strategy 0. Concluding the Emil's devotion correspondence is defined by L1(y) = 0, for every strategy y in the Frances' 
strategy space F. 
 
Devotion equilibria. The set of all devotion equilibria - intersection of the inverse graph of Emil’s devotion rule with 
the graph of Frances’ devotion rule - is the segment [A,D] and it is an infinite set. 
 
1e) About the devotion equilibria. The devotion equilibria are non-cooperatively reachable, playing Emil the reaching-
strategy  0.  Concerning  the  efficiency,  the  devotion  equilibrium  D  is  bad,  since  it  lies  upon  the  Pareto  maximal 
boundary, on the contrary, the devotion equilibrium A is efficient, since it belongs to the Pareto minimal boundary. 
 
8. II phase: properly non-cooperative (egoistic phase) 
 
2a) Best reply correspondences. Concerning the partial derivative of Emil’s loss function with respect to the first 
argument, we have D1f1(x,y) = -4y, for every bistrategy (x,y) of S. So, for the sign of that derivative, there are two cases. 
I case. If y = 0, the partial loss function f1(.,y) is constant and then the Emil’s best reply strategy to this Frances’ action 
0 is any strategy of the space E, in other terms B1(0) = E. II case. If the Frances’ action y is strictly positive, then the 
partial derivative D1f1(x,y) is strictly negative, so the section f1(.,y) is strictly decreasing and the minimum point of the 
section  is the strategy 1, thus  the best reply rule  is defined by B1(y) = 1, for every France’s strategy y  in F\{0}. 
Resuming, the Emil's best-reply correspondence is defined by B1(y) = E if y=0 and B1(y) = 1 if y > 0. Concerning the 
Frances’ best reply rule, we have D2f2(x,y) = 1, hence the partial loss function f2(x,.) is strictly increasing, for each 
Emil’s strategy x, and the Frances’ best reply rule is defined by B2(x) = 0, for every x in E. 
 
Nash equilibria. The intersection of the graph of the best reply correspondence B2 with the reciprocal graph of the best 
reply rule B1 is the segment [A,B], so there are infinitely many Nash equilibria. All these equilibria are equivalent for 
Emil  (Emil’s  loss  function  is  constantly  equal  zero  on  the  segment  [A,B])  but  not  for  Frances,  so  they  are  not 
collectively equivalent. 
 
2b) Existence of Nash equilibria. Kakutany's fixed point theorem assures the existence of at least a Nash equilibrium, 
Brouwer's fixed point theorem does not, since the Emil’s best reply rule is not a function. 
 
2c) About Nash equilibria. The Nash equilibrium zone is reachable, playing Frances the reaching-strategy 0. The Nash 
equilibrium  A  is  minimal,  and  it's  the  unique  minimal  equilibrium  (good  equilibrium),  on  the  contrary,  the  Nash 
equilibrium B is maximal (very bad equilibrium) the other ones are neither minimal nor maximal. The Nash equilibrium 
A is also a devotion equilibrium. 
 
2d) Dominant strategies. Frances has one (and only one) dominant strategy, the strategy 0. Emil has one (and only one) 
dominant strategy, the strategy 1. As in the finite bimatrix game. 
 
2e) Dominant equilibria. The Nash equilibrium B is a dominant Nash equilibrium. 
 
9. III phase: defensive phase 
 
3a) Emil's conservative value. We have, with a simple calculation, v
#
1 = 0. 
 
Emil's worst loss function. By definition, the Emil’s worst loss function w1 is defined on the Emil’s strategy space E by 
f
#
1 (x) = supF f1(x,.), for every Emil’s strategy x in E. Let’s compute the function w1: for the sign of the partial derivative 
of the Emil’s loss function, i.e., the derivative D2f1(x,y) =-4x, there are two cases. I case. If x = 0, then the partial 
derivative is constantly 0 and so the partial function f1(0,.) is constant on E. Then, the worst offensive reply to the 
Emil’s strategy 0 is any Frances’ strategy, in other words O2(0) = [0,1]. II case. If the Emil’s action x is strictly positive, 
then, the partial derivative is strictly decreasing, and so the function f1(x,.) is strictly decreasing, consequently O2(x) = 0, 
for every non-zero x in E. The Emil’s worst loss function is then defined by f 
#
1 (x) = 0 if x = 0 and f 
#
1 (x) = 0 if x > 0, 
for every x in E. 
 




Frances’ worst loss function. It is very simple to deduce that the Emil’s worst offensive multifunction is defined by 
O1(y) = 1, for each y in F. The Frances’ worst loss function is defined by f 
#
2(y) = 1+y, for each y in F. 
 Conservative bivalue. The conservative bivalue is the vector v
# = (0,1) = B’. 
 
3b) Players’ conservative strategies. All the Emil's strategies are conservative, in other terms  E
# = E. The unique 
Frances’ conservative strategy is 0. 
 
Conservative crosses. Finally, the set of all conservative crosses is the segment [A,B], since any bistrategy (x,0) is a 
conservative cross. 
 
3c) Conservative parts. The conservative part of the biloss space is the subset of the biloss space f(S) contained in the 
triangle equal to the convex envelope conv (K’,B’,A’). The Emil’s conservative part E
# is the set of bistrategies (x,y) 
such that the loss -4xy is non-positive (less or equal to v
#
1 = 0), that is the set of any bistrategy (x,y) such that the 
product xy is non-negative, then all the bistrategies of the game are conservative for Emil. Concerning Frances, the 
conservative part F
# is the set of bistrategies such that the loss x+y is less or equal to 1, consequently it coincides with 
the conservative part of the game. 
 
3d) Core. The core of the biloss space is the arc-segment of Pareto minimal boundary with end points H’ and A’: where 
H’ = (-1,1). To determine the core of the game, in the bistrategy space, we have to find the retroimage of the biloss H’. 
A bistrategy H = (x,y) such that H’ = f(H) verifies the two equalities -4xy = -1 and x+y = 1, the resolvent equation of 
this system of equations is -4y+4y
2+1 = 0, which gives us the following feasible solution H = (1/2,1/2), then the core is 
the line-segment core(G) = [A,K]. 
 
Conservative knots. A possible conservative knot N
# verifies the equality v
# = f(N
#), that is, the system -4xy = 0 and 
x+y = 1, which has the solutions N
#
1= (0,1) = D and N
#
2 = (1,0) = B. 
 
3e) About Nash equilibria. There are infinitely many Nash equilibria, forming the segment [A,B]. All the equilibria are 




10. IV phase: offensive phase 
 
4a) Offensive correspondences and equilibria. We already saw that the players's worst offensive correspondences are 
defined by O1(y) = 1, for every strategy y in F, and O2(x) = 1 if x = 0 and 0 if x > 0, respectively. The intersection of the graph of the correspondence O2 with the reciprocal graph of O1 is the unique offensive equilibrium B. 
 
4b)  About  the  offensive  equilibrium.  The  unique  offensive  equilibrium  is  reachable  non-cooperatively  with  the 
strategies 1 and 1, respectively. It is strongly-inefficient, since it lies on the Pareto maximal boundary. 
 
4c) Confrontation of the equilibria. The unique Nash equilibrium that is a devotion equilibrium too is A. The unique 
Nash equilibrium that is an offensive equilibrium too is B. 
 
4d) Dominant offensive strategies. Emil has the unique dominant offensive strategy 1. Frances has the unique dominant 
offensive strategy 0. 
 
4e) About the noncooperative solution. The set of all Nash equilibria [A,B] is controlled by Frances by the strategy 0. 
The equilibrium A is a focal point in the sense of Meyerson: it unique. 
 
11. V phase (cooperative): Selection of Pareto bistrategies 
 
We shall examine the most common cooperative solutions. 
 
5a) Elementary best compromise. The elementary best compromise biloss is the intersection of the segment joining the 
threat biloss v
# with the infimum of the game, thus it satisfies the system Y=(1/4)X+1 and X = -Y
2 with X in [-4,0] and Y 
in [0,2], leading to the resolvent equation X
2+24X+16 = 0, its acceptable solution is a = -12-sqr(128), so the biloss K’ 
= (a,a/4 +1) is the best compromise biloss. The Kalai Smorodinsky solution is the unique corresponding bistrategy 
solving the system -4xy = a and x+y = a+1, i.e., the strategy profile K = ((a+1)/2,(a+1)/2). 
 
5b) Kalai Smorodinsky solution (core best compromise). The Kalai Smorodinsky biloss (or core best compromise 
biloss) is the intersection of the segment joining the threat biloss v
# with the infimum of the core, thus it is the biloss 
(X,Y) satisfying the relations Y = X+1 and X = -Y
2 and with X,Y in [0,1]. Putting c = (-1+sqr(5))/2 the solution is the 
biloss K’’ = (-c
2,c), it  is  the unique core best  compromise biloss. The  core best compromise  solution,  that  is the 
reciprocal image (x,y) by f of the biloss K’’, satisfies the relations -4xy = -c
2 and x+y = c, taking into account that this 
solution must belong to the core, we known also that x = y, and then x = y = c/2. 
 
 
 5c) Nash bargaining solution with v
# as disagreement point. The possible Nash bargaining bilosses, with disagreement 
point represented by the conservative bivalue v
#, are the possible solutions of the following optimization problem: 
 




2) = max X(Y-1), sub X = -Y
2. 
 
The section of the Nash bargaining objective function upon the constraint is defined by 
 
  g(Y) = -Y




for every Frances’ loss Y. The derivative g’(Y) = -3Y
2+2Y is non-negative when the product Y(3Y-2) is non-positive, 
that is on the interval [0,2/3], consequently the maximum point of the section g is the loss Y = 2/3, with corresponding 
Emil's loss X =-4/9 (obtained by the constraint). Concluding the biloss N’ = (-4/9,2/3) is the unique Nash bargaining 




5d) Bilosses closest to the shadow minimum. The closest biloss to the shadow minimum S’ is the pair (-7/2,sqr (7/2)). 
In fact, we can follow two ways. 1
st way. Let us impose the orthogonality of the vector v joining the point (-4,0) with the 
generic point P = (-Y
2,Y) of the minimal Pareto boundary with a tangent vector, say t, to the boundary at the same point 
P. The vector v is the pair difference between the point P and the shadow minimum a = inf G’, that is the pair (4-Y
2,Y); 
a tangent vector at P is the vector (-2Y,1) (obtained by derivation of the parametrizazion of the Pareto boundary w 
defined by w(s) = (-s





must be 0, that is 
 
  -2Y (4-Y
2) + Y = 0, 
 
this equation has the immediate solution Y = 0 and leads to the simple equation 2Y
2-7 = 0. 2
nd way. We can minimize 
the distance function d(a,.) upon the Pareto boundary; this method leads to the same resolvent equation. Indeed, we 
have 




 2 + Y
2, 
 
for every Frances’ loss Y. We must minimize the function h and we have 
 
  h’(Y) = 2(4-Y
2)(-2Y) + 2Y, 
 
and this is 0 if and only if 2Y
2-7 = 0, as we predicted. 
 
5d bis) Bilosses closest to the core shadow minimum. The closest biloss to the core shadow minimum is the core biloss 
Q’ = (-1/2,sqr (1/2)). 1
st way. Let us impose the orthogonality of the vector v joining the point (-1,0) with the generic 
point P = (-Y
2,Y) of the minimal Pareto boundary with a tangent vector, say t, to the boundary at the same point P. The 
vector v is the pair difference between the point P and the shadow minimum inf coreG’, that is the pair (1-Y
2,Y); a 
tangent vector at P is the vector (-2Y,1) (obtained by derivation of the parametrizazion w defined by w(s) = (-s
2,s), for 
every real s). The orthogonality imposes that the Euclidean scalar product 
 
  (1-Y
2,Y) . (-2Y,1) 
 
must be 0, that is 
 
  -2Y (1-Y
2) + Y = 0, 
 
this equation has the immediate solution Y = 0 and leads to the simple equation 2Y
2-1 = 0. 2
nd way. We can minimize 




5e) Minimum aggregate loss (maximum collective utility). The possible bilosses with maximum collective utility are 
the possible solutions of the following optimization problem: 
 
  min (X +Y) sub X=-Y
2. 
 
We immediately see that the unique biloss with these two properties is C’ = (-4,2), with collective utility 2. The unique 
maximum utility solution of the game is then the corresponding bistrategy C.  
 
 
5f) About the cooperative solutions. The cooperative solutions we found are different and not equivalent each other.  
 
6f) Transferable utility. Assuming the games with transferable utility, certainly the maximum utility solution is a good 
solution; but in this last case, the players must face the bargaining problem of fair division of the maximum collective 
utility. 
 
Fair division of the total gain. It is easy to see that all the core compromise solutions on the minimal collective loss 
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